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Pathbreakers? Women’s Electoral Success and Future Political Participation1 
Short title: Women’s Success and Political Participation 
 
Abstract 
We investigate whether the event of women being competitively elected as state legislators 
encourages subsequent political participation among women. Using a regression discontinuity design 
on Indian constituency level data, we find that female incumbents are more likely than male 
incumbents to re-contest and that there is a decline in the entry of new women candidates. This 
decline is most pronounced in states with entrenched gender bias and in male-headed parties, 
suggesting an intensification of barriers against women in these areas. Similar results for (mostly 
male) Muslim candidates indicate the presence of institutionalised demand-side barriers rather than 
gender-specific preferences and constraints.  
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Women are under-represented in political office around the world, accounting for only 23% of the 
membership of national parliaments globally. In 2015, they comprised 12% of India’s national 
legislators, 19% of the United States Congress and 29% of the United Kingdom’s House of 
Commons. There is a similar under-representation of women in leadership positions in other fields, 
including the corporate sector and academia (Bertrand and Hallock, 2001; Bertrand, 2009; Ginther 
and Kahn, 2014). For instance, in 2014, women comprised 40% of the workforce globally, but only 
10% of corporate board members globally and 4.8% of Fortune 500 CEOs. The numerical under-
representation of women in politics is often associated with substantive under-representation. 
Several recent papers find that increasing women’s political representation results in policy choices 
that are more favorable to women (Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004; Rehavi, 2012; Iyer et al, 2012). 
Moreover, women’s political participation has been shown to improve broader development 
outcomes such as investments in children (Miller, 2008; Clots-Figueras, 2012; Bhalotra and Clots-
Figueras, 2014; Brollo and Troiano, 2016), economic performance (Baskaran et al, 2015) and 
corruption (Dollar et al, 2001; Swamy et al, 2001). This literature suggests that women’s under-
representation in political office disadvantages one half of society, and may have additional social 
costs.  
Using data from India’s state legislative assembly elections, we investigate whether the 
electoral success of women leads to subsequent increases in women’s participation as political 
candidates. We focus upon women’s candidacy as the data suggest that the small share of women 
candidates is an important proximate barrier to the presence of women in political office: women 
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comprised 5.5% of election winners, but only 4.4% of electoral candidates.2 A woman’s 
demonstrated electoral success has the potential to change the views of voters and parties regarding 
the role of women in politics, leading to greater demand for women candidates. Alternatively, a 
woman winning could create a positive ‘role model’ effect, encouraging other women to come 
forward as candidates.3 
We use nationwide data from 3473 constituencies over the period 1980-2007 to investigate 
whether a woman winning a seat in the state legislative assembly results in greater participation of 
women from her constituency in subsequent elections. Legislation on many important topics, 
including law and order, health and education, is determined at the state level in India. Importantly, 
there are no political quotas for women at this level, making our analysis different from recent 
studies of the impact of gender quotas on subsequent political participation.  
In order to estimate causal effects of women’s electoral victory, we use a regression 
discontinuity (RD) design, comparing women’s political participation in places where a woman 
narrowly won an election to those in which a woman narrowly lost an election. We conduct several 
tests to verify the validity of the RD strategy. These include showing that pre-determined political 
and demographic characteristics, as well as the characteristics of the candidate pool, are similar 
across places where women won vs lost in mixed-gender races. Our results are robust to controlling 
for election-specific factors and using alternative samples, functional forms and bandwidths.  
Our analysis yields four main insights. First, a woman’s electoral victory leads to an increase 
in the share of women candidates from major parties in the next election. This is primarily driven by 
an increased propensity of the incumbent woman to contest for re-election. This intensive-margin 
response is important in India where, in contrast to the U.S., incumbents often do not re-contest. 
                                                 
2 No previous work has systematically analyzed candidacy for competitive state assembly elections in India.  
3 See Casas-Arce and Saiz (2015) for a model in which the roles of voters, parties and candidates are delineated.  
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Moreover, the baseline probability of women incumbents re-contesting is smaller than for men: 34% 
of female incumbents and 28% of male incumbents do not run for re-election despite the absence of 
any term limits. Further analysis shows that the incumbency effect on women’s candidacy is 
restricted to the party of the winning candidate: women incumbents are significantly more likely 
than male incumbents to re-contest from the same party, and significantly less likely to switch 
parties. However, we find that incumbent women are not more likely to win the next election.  
Second, we can decisively reject that there is increased entry of new major party women 
candidates in constituencies in which a woman won the previous election. In fact, in most 
specifications, there is a significant decline in the entry of new women candidates after a woman 
wins an election. This is not simply a consequence of the incumbent woman’s greater probability of 
re-contesting. There is also no increase in new women candidates in nearby constituencies or from 
the opposing party. 
Third, we find striking evidence that this ‘discouragement’ effect on the entry of new female 
candidates emerges from states characterised by entrenched gender bias, proxied by population 
gender ratios (Sen, 2003). In these states, there is a significantly lower overall candidacy response 
after a woman wins an election, particularly within male-headed parties, and the next election is 
marked by a significant decline in the share of new women candidates. In sharp contrast, for states 
with relatively low levels of entrenched prejudice, there is no decline in the new female candidate 
share (although no increase either), and a larger probability that the incumbent woman re-contests. 
In these areas, following women’s electoral success, we also see significant increases in female and 
male voter turnout and the share of votes received by women. Our findings are suggestive of a 
‘backlash’ effect in the more gender unequal states, as they indicate persistence and possible 
intensification of bias against women (from voters or political parties) following women’s electoral 
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victory.4 Such a backlash effect can decrease the demand for new women candidates. An alternative 
possibility is a reduced supply of new women candidates due to ‘stereotype threat’, which refers to 
minority groups behaving in ways that confirm group stereotypes when their group identity is made 
salient.5   
Fourth, while it is inherently difficult to isolate demand versus supply factors, we are able to 
rule out the role of specific supply side factors. We find that implementation of a gender quota in 
local governments, which created a massive increase in the number of women with political 
experience, increases the overall candidacy response in gender-biased states, but we continue to see a 
decline in the entry of new candidates. This makes it unlikely that our findings are driven by a 
shortage of women who are suitable political candidates. We also conduct a parallel analysis for 
Muslims, who form India’s largest religious minority, are socio-economically disadvantaged, and 
under-represented in political office in India (Bhalotra et al, 2014). Our estimates for Muslims are 
strikingly similar to our estimates for women: we find no increase in the entry of new Muslim 
candidates following a Muslim winning office, and a stronger candidacy response in states in which 
Muslims are less disadvantaged.  As Muslim candidates are predominantly male, this makes it 
unlikely that the results for women are on account of gender specific constraints such as family 
commitments or a reluctance to engage in competitive races.   
Our study contributes to two main streams of the literature. The first concerns the barriers 
facing women in attaining leadership positions. Most previous research examining the impact of 
                                                 
4 Previous studies have documented evidence of backlash whereby men react negatively to higher earnings of women or 
to women performing non-traditional roles (Schuler et al, 1996; Luke and Munshi, 2011; Mani, 2011; Bertrand et al, 
2013; Gangadharan et al, 2015). Gagliarducci and Paserman (2012) report a similar heterogeneity in responses to women 
mayors in Italy. On average, they find a significantly greater probability of early termination of the legislature when the 
mayor is a woman, and this tendency is significantly stronger in the Southern regions and when the mayor interacts with 
an entirely male council. 
5
 Stereotype threat, often measured by the performance of minority groups in standardised tests or participation in 
meetings, has been documented for racial minorities (Steele and Aronson, 1995), lower castes in India (Hoff and Pandey, 
2006), women (Kray et al, 2002; Marx and Roman, 2002) and men in areas of female expertise (Coffman, 2014), but it 
has not been analysed in the literature on women’s political participation. 
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elected women leaders on future women’s political participation has examined the impact of gender 
quotas.6 In contrast, our study investigates the dynamics of women’s participation in state 
legislatures, where quotas are absent. Demonstration effects of women leaders may be greater in the 
absence of quotas, for several reasons. For instance, quotas may lead to political parties strategically 
placing women candidates in races they are unlikely to win (Bagues and Esteve-Volart, 2012; Casas-
Arce and Saiz, 2015). Quotas can widen the quality gap between male and female candidates and 
reinforcing negative stereotypes if women in reserved seats are less qualified than men (Coate and 
Loury, 1993; Bardhan et al, 2010; Besley et al, 2012). Quotas can also generate negative spillovers in 
candidacy, with fewer women being fielded in non-quota constituencies (see Sekhon and Titiunik, 
2012’s reanalysis of Bhavnani, 2009’s quota results). On the other hand, quotas may have more 
positive effects on women’s candidacy than competitive victories if women are more likely to enter 
competitive activities in a single-sex environment (Gneezy et al, 2003).  
We present the first estimates (for any country) of how within-constituency political 
participation of women responds to the competitive electoral success of women. The only other 
study we are aware of in a competitive setting is Broockman (2013) who, similar to our study, finds 
no spillover effects of women winning seats in U.S. state legislatures on women’s candidacy in 
nearby constituencies. There is little room to investigate within-constituency dynamics of women’s 
candidacy in the U.S., since incumbents almost always run for re-election. The findings from the 
analysis of quotas are mixed. Bertrand et al (2014) analyze corporate board quotas in Norway and 
find no impact on the career decisions of the next generation of women, while de Paola et al (2010) 
document increased political participation of women in Italy after a short-term gender quota in local 
government. Beaman et al (2009) find no tangible improvements in subsequent candidacy or success 
                                                 
6 Beaman et al (2009), Bhavnani (2009), Deininger and Nagarajan (2011) and Banerjee et al (2013) all examine the impact 
of local government gender quotas in specific regions of India.  
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among women after a woman has led the village council for one term (five years), but significant 
increases after a woman has headed the village council for two consecutive terms.  
Our results show that while electoral victory enables incumbent women to run for re-
election (a non-trivial margin in India), it does not result in increased entry of new women 
candidates. Previous electoral victory for women also does not increase the probability of a woman 
winning the next election. This means that repeated exposure to female state legislators is unlikely to 
happen in a competitive setting, especially in gender-biased states.  
The second stream of research that we contribute to is that on incumbency advantage.7 This 
literature has focused upon whether incumbents are more likely to win the next election, but 
winning is conditional on re-contesting. By testing whether the incumbent re-contests, we effectively 
model this selection process, which is important in many countries outside the U.S., such as India 
and Brazil, where a large fraction of incumbents do not re-contest (De Magalhaes, 2014). Studies 
examining gender differences in incumbency advantage include Ferreira and Gyourko (2014), who 
show that female incumbents exhibit stronger winning chances in the U.S. (a setting where 
incumbents almost always re-contest) and Brollo and Troiano (2016), who find weaker winning 
chances for women in Brazil, a setting with term limits.  
Our study shows that candidacy dynamics after an electoral victory are strongly dependent 
on the overall social context, and that therefore there is no general gender advantage or 
disadvantage. Another contribution of our work is that we deviate from the recent tendency to 
analyze incumbency advantage at the party level. In the presence of party-switching, such as occurs 
in India and Brazil for example, it is relevant to study incumbent behaviour at the candidate level.  
                                                 
7 There is a widely documented incumbency advantage in the U.S. (Gelman and King, 1990; Lee, 2008; Cox and Katz, 
1996; Ferreira and Gyourko, 2014), but previous work has documented an incumbency disadvantage in India (Linden, 
2004; Uppal, 2009) and other developing countries (MacDonald, 2013; Klasnja and Titiunik,  2016). Most of these 
studies do not examine candidacy. See Erikson and Titiunik (2015) for a recent discussion of the conditions under which 
the RD design can be used to recover the personal incumbency advantage (in winning). 
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The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides relevant background on the 
Indian political system, Section 3 describes our empirical strategy, and Section 4 performs many 
empirical checks on the validity of this strategy. Sections 5 and 6 present our empirical findings, and 
Section 7 concludes. 
 
1. Women in Indian Politics  
1.1. Indian Electoral Politics 
India is the world’s largest democracy, with a parliamentary system of government at both 
the federal and state levels. Elections are held every five years, on a first-past-the-post system in 
single-member constituencies. States may occasionally hold midterm elections, before the five-year 
term when the government expires, if the governing coalition loses the confidence of the majority of 
the state legislature and an alternative government cannot be formed. We focus on elections to state 
legislatures. In India’s federal system, state governments are responsible for several development 
policy areas including law and order, health and education, and the financing of village councils. 
State level parties play a significant role in forming governing coalitions at the center, and previous 
research has shown that state-level voting behaviour is highly correlated with voting in national 
elections (Ravishankar, 2009).  
There are currently no quotas for women in state or national level elections. A one-third 
quota for women in district and village level councils was mandated by a constitutional amendment 
in 1993.8 In March 2010, a bill proposing to enact a one-third quota for women in national and state 
legislatures was passed by the upper house of parliament, but it has not yet been passed in the lower 
house, making the analysis in this paper highly topical.  
                                                 
8 The impact of this reform has been examined in several recent papers including Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004), 
Beaman et al (2009) and Iyer et al (2012).  
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In India’s political system, party leaders decide who their candidate will be in every 
constituency.9 There are no primaries as in the United States, and the process of choosing candidates 
is not transparent. We conducted interviews with politicians from several Indian political parties to 
understand the candidate selection process. In general, it was described as follows: parties draw up 
an initial (informal) short list of 2-5 candidates from each constituency, and then embark on 
information gathering exercises, including third-party voter surveys, to assess candidate quality. The 
candidate quality emphasised by all parties was the ability to attract votes, termed ‘winnability’ in 
Indian politics. To this end, several metrics including candidate name recognition within the 
constituency, service to the party, financial resources, caste identity and internal party support were 
considered relevant. The candidate selection process was described as being very constituency 
specific, with local name recognition and local resources being important and it being unusual to 
‘parachute’ in candidates from outside the constituency.  
 
1.2.  Data on Women’s Political Participation in State Elections 
We obtained data on elections to state legislative assemblies in 3473 constituencies from the 
Election Commission of India over the period 1980-2007, during which most states had six 
elections. Electoral constituency boundaries remained fixed through this period, so we do not have 
to worry about concerns such as gerrymandering which might differentially affect the electoral 
prospects for women. We have information on the name, gender, party affiliation and votes 
obtained by every candidate, as well as gender-specific voter turnout by constituency. We use data 
for the 16 major states of India that account for over 95% of the total population.10 We also 
                                                 
9
 See Norris and Lovenduski (1995) on the relative importance of party vs candidate decisions in the U.K. 
10 The states included are: Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, 
Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal. In 2001, three 
new states of Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh and Uttarakhand were carved out of the larger states of Bihar, Madhya Pradesh 
and Uttar Pradesh respectively. For the new states of Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh, electoral constituency boundaries 
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obtained relevant demographic data (literacy, urbanization, gender ratio, fraction of lower castes and 
tribes etc.) at the constituency level from the 2001 census, by matching villages to constituencies.11 
We tracked candidates by name over successive elections to identify whether candidates in a 
specific election were present in the previous election.12 Overall, in our sample, more than three-
quarters of all candidates (85% of women and 83% of men) did not contest the previous election, 
i.e. are ‘new’ candidates. Systematic data on candidate attributes are available only after 2004, when 
the Election Commission made it mandatory for all candidates to file affidavits giving details of their 
age, education, asset ownership and any pending criminal charges. We have this information for 
candidates in 14 out of 16 states that held elections between 2004 and 2007. Compared to male 
candidates, women candidates are on average three years younger, less likely to have completed high 
school, and less likely to have any criminal charges filed against them (summary statistics available 
upon request). In examining the validity of our regression discontinuity strategy, we will test whether 
these characteristics vary across winners and losers in mixed-gender elections.  
Despite the institution of universal adult suffrage since 1950, women are still dramatically 
under-represented in India’s state legislatures. As mentioned earlier, only 5.5% of state legislators 
and 4.4% of candidates were women in our sample period, 1980-2007. Almost 70% of electoral 
races had no female candidates at all, and only 7% of races had more than one woman candidate. 
Women’s candidacy shows a secular increase over time, but varies considerably across the states. For 
instance, in 2000-2007, the share of female candidates from major parties ranged from almost 13% 
in the state of Andhra Pradesh to only 4% in the neighboring state of Karnataka (Appendix Figure 
A1).  
                                                                                                                                                             
remained fixed over time. We drop the data from the Uttarakhand state elections of 2002 and 2007 since we are unable 
to match the electoral constituencies over time. 
11 We thank Rikhil Bhavnani and Sandip Sukhtankar for sharing these data with us. 
12 Candidate names are frequently spelt differently across elections and many candidates change party affiliations. We 
therefore performed a manual matching of candidate names over time. 
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State elections in India are very competitive. In our data, the mean number of candidates per 
constituency is ten (median is eight). Of these, only 3 candidates on average manage to obtain more 
than 5 percent of the votes cast, suggesting that the majority of candidates in India’s electoral races 
are not politically viable. In order to focus on candidates who are politically meaningful, we do two 
things. First, in many specifications, we restrict attention to candidates from ‘major’ parties defined 
as those parties that won at least 5% of the seats in any state legislature in any year over our sample 
period. On average, only 34% of candidates in our data are from these major parties. Second, we 
analyze separately the fraction of ‘competitive’ women candidates, namely those who win at least 5% 
of the vote in a given race. As we might expect, there is a significant overlap between these two 
categories: 88% of major party candidates are competitive according to this definition.  
Major parties (as defined above) are more likely to nominate women candidates, with 5.6% 
of their candidates being women compared to only 3.7% of independent candidates. Over the 
period 1980-2007, only four out of forty major parties in India were headed by women.13 Women-
headed parties have a slightly higher share of female candidates, 7% compared to the 5% share for 
major parties not headed by women. There is no a priori evidence that women avoid more 
competitive races. In fact, electoral races in which a female candidate is present tend to have larger 
electorates and a greater number of candidates.  
 
2. Identifying the Effects of Women’s Electoral Success: The Regression Discontinuity 
Design  
 We are interested in how indicators of women’s political participation at the electoral 
constituency level respond to a woman having won the previous election. The identification 
problem is that a woman’s political victory might be correlated with unobserved constituency 
                                                 
13 These are the Indian National Congress under Sonia Gandhi, the Bahujan Samaj Party under Mayawati, the All India 
Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam under Jayalalithaa and the All India Trinamul Congress under Mamata Banerjee. 
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characteristics, such as voter preferences, that might directly determine women’s participation in 
subsequent elections. We address these problems using a regression discontinuity (RD) estimator, 
focusing on mixed-gender electoral races decided by a narrow margin. Treatment assignment 
depends on the running variable, the vote margin between a woman and a man. The probability of a 
woman winning an election exhibits a sharp discontinuity when this vote margin is zero, since the 
candidate with the most votes wins, irrespective of how close the runner up stands.14 The identifying 
assumption is that the assignment of treatment around the threshold (i.e. a woman winner rather 
than a man) is uncorrelated with any observed or unobserved characteristics of the candidate pool or 
the constituency.15 The estimated model is of the form: 
 
Yist = a + b WomanWonis,t-1 + f(Mis,t-1) +  eist      (1) 
 
Yist is a measure of female political candidacy for constituency i in state s and year t. We focus upon 
the share of women candidates (overall and among major parties) as well as the probability of having 
at least one female candidate in the constituency and the fraction of competitive female candidates. 
The running variable Mis,t-1 is defined as the vote share difference (in the previous election) between 
the female and male candidates in the constituency who obtained the most votes, irrespective of 
whether they were the winner and the runner up (similar to the strategy in Meyersson, 2014). 
WomanWonis,t-1 is a dummy which equals one if a woman won against a man in the previous 
election (Mis,t-1 >0) and zero if the woman lost (Mis,t-1 <0). The parameter b captures the causal 
impact of this event on women’s participation as candidates in the next election. In order to define 
                                                 
14 See Lee (2008) for the seminal use of the regression discontinuity design using electoral data. Studies that use close 
elections between men and women include Rehavi (2012), Clots-Figueras (2011 and 2012), Bhalotra and Clots-Figueras 
(2014), and Brollo and Troiano (2016). 
15 We thus implicitly test whether winning matters discontinuously, that is, significantly more than a good electoral 
performance that falls short of winning (captured by woman being runners-up in the ‘control group’ of constituencies in 
which women lose mixed-gender elections).  
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Mis,t-1 consistently, the sample is restricted to elections with at least one female candidate. The results 
are similar when we use a more restricted sample of elections selected to ensure that the winner and 
runner are of opposite gender (see Appendix Table A3). Standard errors are clustered at the level of 
the administrative district to allow for correlated outcomes across all constituencies within the same 
district and over time. This is more conservative than clustering at the constituency level, though we 
shall verify that doing the latter leaves our results unchanged.  
We fit a flexible function of the vote margin, f(Mis,t-1), that is allowed to differ on each side 
of the discontinuity, using three approaches to investigate sensitivity of the estimates to this. First, 
we fit second-order polynomials (e.g. Lee, Moretti and Butler, 2004) since Gelman and Imbens 
(2014) argue against the use of higher order polynomials in RD designs; we also show that our 
results are robust to using higher-order polynomials. Second, we estimate local linear regressions 
(Hahn et al, 2001; Imbens and Lemieux, 2008), restricting the sample to an optimal bandwidth 
around the discontinuity, with the optimal bandwidth selected by applying the methods in Imbens 
and Kalyanaraman (2012) and also the methods in Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014). Finally, 
we also investigate robustness to using a ‘discontinuity sample’, restricting the sample to a very small 
bandwidth around the discontinuity and testing the differences in means on both sides of the 
discontinuity (Angrist and Lavy, 1999). 
To investigate area spillovers, we replace the dependent variable in (1) with an indicator of 
women’s political participation in constituencies other than the index constituency i, but within the 
same administrative district (which typically consists of 9-10 electoral constituencies), or 
parliamentary constituency (typically covering 6-8 state electoral constituencies). To examine 
persistence in the relationship of interest, we estimate equation (1) replacing the first lag with longer 
lags. This provides reduced form estimates of how women’s participation in election t responds to a 
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woman having won in election t-2 or t-3 (ten and fifteen years ago), respectively. We do not 
condition upon whether a woman won in each intervening period because this is endogenous.  
While regression discontinuity estimates are likely to satisfy internal validity conditions, they 
may or may not have external validity. However, there are several indications that our results have 
considerable external validity. First, Figure 1A shows that the vote share obtained by all women 
contesting in constituencies in which the margin of victory between the male and female candidates 
is close to zero ranges from less than 20% to 65%. In favor of external validity, this shows a wide 
variation in preferences for female politicians in our sample. Second, we examined the extent to 
which the identity of constituencies that have mixed-gender elections changes from one election 
year to the next and found that there is a fair degree of churning; among the constituencies that have 
at least one mixed-gender election, nearly 60% have had only one or two mixed-gender elections 
over this three-decade period. This again points to external validity inasmuch as it establishes that a 
wide variety of constituencies have experienced mixed-gender elections. In addition, OLS results 
using the whole sample are fairly similar to the RD results.16 Since constituencies that have at least 
one woman candidate vary over time, restricting to these samples creates an unbalanced panel 
(Sekhon and Titiunik, 2012). We therefore estimated the coefficient of interest for one pair of 
election years at a time to investigate the stability of the relationship across areas and years, and 
found no significant differences in the estimates (available on request). 
 
3. Investigating the Validity of the Regression Discontinuity Design 
Before presenting our results, we conduct several checks to ensure the validity of our 
empirical strategy, namely that the only variable that varies discontinuously at the vote margin of 
                                                 
16 We run OLS regressions for the full sample, controlling for constituency and election-cycle fixed effects, and district-
specific linear time trends. The OLS sample differs primarily in that it includes elections in which there are no female 
candidates, thereby extending the ‘control group’ of constituencies to include a wider and more heterogeneous set of 
areas. These results are available in Appendix Table A2. 
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zero is the gender of the elected candidate, rather than other area or candidate characteristics, or the 
vote margin itself. 
 
3.1.   Preferences for Women Politicians and Continuity of the Vote Margin 
An assumption underlying the RD strategy is that preferences for female politicians are 
similar on both sides of the discontinuity, so that the discontinuity isolates the role of the gender of 
the winner. We measure preferences for female politicians as the fraction of votes won by all women 
contesting in the constituency. Figure 1B shows that the assumption holds, there being no jump in 
the female vote share at the zero vote margin. We should emphasize that we are comparing areas 
where women won to those in which a woman lost i.e. both types of areas had women candidates. 
While greater electoral competition has been shown to increase women’s political participation 
within parties (Folke and Rickne, 2016), our comparison is within the set of highly competitive 
places since the identification comes from comparing elections with narrow electoral victories for 
women to elections with narrow electoral losses for women. 
Another RD assumption is that the density of the running variable, the vote margin between 
the female and the male candidate, is continuous at the winning threshold, i.e. at the zero vote 
margin. We plotted the density of the vote margin which looks smooth throughout (Figure 2A) and, 
following McCrary (2008), we formally verify that there is no significant discontinuity at the zero 
point (Figure 2B). Manipulation of the vote margin is unlikely in our setting, since the Election 
Commission of India has a well-established reputation for independence and political neutrality, and 
Indian elections are considered free and fair. 
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3.2.  Continuity in Candidate Characteristics  
We verify that the characteristics of the candidate pool are very similar across places where 
women win elections and places where women do not.  Figure 3 examines a range of candidate 
characteristics including education levels, net worth, whether the candidate is an incumbent, and 
whether the candidate belongs to a women-headed party and whether any criminal charges have 
been filed against the candidate (including corruption charges).17 We find that the candidate pool 
looks very similar in all these dimensions across places where women won elections and where they 
did not. In separate analyses, we have also verified that the characteristics of male candidates and 
female candidates look very similar across places where women won and where women lost (results 
available upon request). 
Recent studies have questioned the validity of the RD premise that the (party) identity of the 
winner is quasi-random in close elections, showing that the incumbent party in U.S. elections tends 
to have systematically greater chances of winning even when elections are close, consistent with 
incumbents using their greater power to manipulate their chances (Caughey and Sekhon, 2011; 
Grimmer et al, 2011). However, Eggers et al (2015) argue that such sorting is unique to the U.S. 
House in the post-war period, and find no evidence of it in several other countries including India. 
Along these lines, we have verified that candidate characteristics such as age, gender, education, net 
worth or incumbency do not predict success in mixed-gender races (results available upon request). 
 
 
                                                 
17 Female politicians may be more likely to have family connections to other politicians than male politicians in India’s 
national parliament (French, 2011) and in the U.S. (Dal Bó et al, 2009). Due to the large number of candidates for state 
legislative assembly elections across the country we are unable to replicate the French (2011) methodology of contacting 
local journalists in each constituency to assess the extent of such connections at the local level. As French says, ‘It was 
not enough to take prominent names and make larger deductions from them. Equally, much of the information did not 
seem to exist. Only someone who worked at a local level, perhaps as a political journalist, would be likely to know how 
each MP in their area entered politics.’ However, it is unlikely that family connections of the winner matter in mixed-
gender close elections, given that we show all other observable characteristics of female winners and female runners-up 
to be similar.  
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3.3.  Continuity in Demographic and Political Characteristics 
We also verified that a range of demographic covariates (population gender ratios, literacy 
rates, proportion of lower castes and backward tribes, the male-female literacy differential) and pre-
determined electoral variables (total number of votes polled, the number of major party female 
candidates and female voter turnout in the previous election) do not vary discontinuously at the RD 
threshold (Figures 4A-4G). This gives us confidence that our results do not reflect pre-existing 
demographic or political differences across places where women won or did not win elections. 
 
4. Main Results: Does Women’s Political Participation Respond to Prior Electoral 
Success? 
We first investigate whether women’s electoral success leads to an increase in the share of 
female candidates in the next election, and test robustness to varying the RD specification. We find 
an increase in the overall share of major party women candidates following a woman’s electoral 
victory, primarily driven by women incumbents being more likely to re-contest than male 
incumbents. We find no increase in the entry of new women candidates and, in many specifications, 
a significant decline. In section 6, we investigate the potential mechanisms behind these findings. 
 
4.1.  Political Candidacy 
The event of a woman winning an election leads to a large and statistically significant 
increase of 18.5 percentage points in the probability of a major party fielding at least one woman 
candidate in the subsequent election in her constituency (Table 1, Panel A, column 1). This 
translates into an 8.5 percentage point increase in the female share of major party candidates 
(column 2), which corresponds to 40% of a standard deviation in the sample of constituencies with 
at least one female candidate. A visual representation of these estimates is in Figure 5A, which 
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shows a jump in the probability of having a major party female candidate at the zero vote margin, to 
the left of which a woman narrowly lost the previous election and to the right of which a woman 
narrowly won the previous election against a man. We see a similar discontinuity for the female 
share of major party candidates (Figure 5B). As the share of female candidates will rise if there are 
more women or if there are fewer candidates in all, we investigated candidate numbers. We find an 
increase in the number of major party female candidates (column 3); and no significant change in the 
total number of candidates from major parties (column 4), which indicates that women candidates 
effectively substitute for male candidates.  
We also model the competitiveness of women by defining as the dependent variable, the 
share of women among candidates who get at least 5% of total votes cast. This is significantly higher 
in constituencies in which a woman won in the previous election  (column 5). This establishes that 
the increase in candidacy that we observe following an electoral victory by a female politician is of 
politically viable women fielded by politically relevant parties. In contrast to the observed increase in 
women’s candidacy within major parties, the fraction of independent women candidates—those not 
affiliated with any party—does not increase (column 6).18 We find no significant impact of women 
having won the previous election on the chances of a woman winning the current election (column 
7). This is consistent with previous evidence indicating an incumbency disadvantage in Indian state 
elections (Uppal, 2009).  
 
4.2.  Robustness of RD Estimates 
We investigate robustness of the estimates to varying the functional form of the running 
variable in regressions run on the full sample, to estimating local linear regressions with varying 
bandwidths (including a very narrow discontinuity sample), to controlling for election-specific 
                                                 
18
 Given that major parties account for only one-third of candidates overall, we find no increase in overall female 
candidacy after a woman’s electoral victory. 
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factors, and to restricting the sample to elections in which the top two vote-getters are a man and a 
woman. We also present a placebo check in which we vary the discontinuity point. 
 
 
4.2.1. Robustness to functional form and sample for the running variable  
The specification in Table 1 (Panel A) controls for a quadratic polynomial in the victory 
margin, which is allowed to be different on either side of the discontinuity. We verify that the 
coefficients on the suite of outcomes in Table 1 remains similar in size and significance when a local 
linear regression is estimated on a sample restricted to an optimal bandwidth around the 
discontinuity, using optimal bandwidths as specified by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) in Panel B 
and by Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014) in Panel C.  
We conduct further checks for the female share of major party candidates, which is the main 
outcome in Table 1. First we generalize the polynomial in the victory margin to the third and fourth 
order, retaining the full sample, and we find very little change in the coefficient of interest 
(Appendix Table A3, columns 1 and 2) We then restrict the sample to small bandwidths of 0.1 and 
then 0.05, controlling for linear trends on either side of the discontinuity in the first case and simply 
comparing the mean of the dependent variable on both sides of the discontinuity for the smaller 
bandwidth, along the lines of Angrist and Lavy (1999), and our results remain unchanged (columns 3 
and 4). The estimates in column 5 examine the stability of the estimated coefficient to inclusion of a 
vector of state-year fixed effects which control for all relevant election-specific factors such as 
whether the previous Chief Minister was a woman, whether there was a woman party leader in the 
current election, or whether a new woman-headed party had been formed. The estimated coefficient 
retains its size and significance. Our results are also unchanged if we cluster the standard errors at 
the finer constituency level rather than the district level (column 6). 
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Finally, we restrict the sample to elections where a woman and a man were among the top 
two candidates in terms of votes won. This may be relevant if, for instance, the top two candidates 
are men but a woman is close behind as the third vote-winner. The coefficients are similar to the 
baseline results in size and significance, both when we control for a second-order polynomial on 
either side of the discontinuity (column 7) and when we use the Imbens and Kalyanaraman optimal 
bandwidth (column 8). Our results remain similar when we further restrict the sample to elections in 
which the third candidate did not have a chance to win i.e. elections where the margin between the 
first and third candidates was larger than 5%, 10% or 20% (results available upon request). 
 
4.2.2. Fake or placebo discontinuities 
We tested for discontinuous increases in candidacy at points of the vote margin distribution 
at which there should be no jumps, that is, at points other than zero, as suggested in Imbens and 
Lemieux (2008). We re-computed the RD estimates using ‘fake’ discontinuities at various points 
both to the left and to the right of the discontinuity. Appendix Figure A2 plots the t-statistics 
obtained from this series of RD estimates. We see that the largest t-statistic is at the real 
discontinuity, i.e. at the zero point, while all other t-statistics at placebo discontinuity points indicate 
statistical insignificance.  
 
4.3. New Candidate Entry vs Incumbent Candidacy  
In this section, we examine how much of the observed rise in women’s candidacy is 
attributable to the entry of new women candidates. We identify incumbent as opposed to new 
candidates by tracking candidates through our sample by their name. We find no evidence of new 
candidate entry, in fact, the regression coefficient for the new female share of major party candidates 
is negative and statistically significant for two of the three RD estimators (Table 2, column 1, Panels 
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A and B); we investigate this in more detail below. There is no significant impact of women’s victory 
on the entry of new male candidates (column 2).  
Incumbent women are significantly more likely to run for re-election than incumbent men 
(column 3). While this is consistent with the idea that women candidates are positively selected (as 
documented by Anzia and Berry, 2011, for the U.S.), we should note that in India, there is a gender 
gap that disfavors women in the baseline probability of women incumbents running for re-election: 
34% of female winners and 28% of male winners do not run for re-election in the full sample. Since 
party-switching is frequent in India, we investigated incumbent candidacy by party. We find that 
women incumbents are more likely than male incumbents to contest from the incumbent party 
(Table 2, column 4), and significantly less likely to switch parties in the election after they win 
(column 5). These results retain their size and significance regardless of the specification or the 
bandwidth used (Table 2, Panels B and C).  
It is possible that the presence of an incumbent woman politician might discourage new 
female candidates in her constituency due to splitting of the gendered votes. While we cannot test 
this rigorously because the incumbent’s decision to contest is endogenous, we have verified that the 
impact on new female candidate entry does not differ by whether the incumbent chooses to run for 
re-election (new female candidate share declines by 1.8 percentage points when the incumbent is 
running for re-election, and by 2.3 percentage points when the incumbent does not run for re-
election). 
 
 
4.4. Candidacy Spillovers across Parties and Constituencies 
In this section, we first examine party-level (rather than candidate-level) responses and then 
examine whether there are any spillovers of a woman winning in a given constituency on women’s 
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participation in nearby constituencies. We find that, in constituencies where women won the 
previous election, it is strictly only the winner’s party that is more likely to field a woman candidate 
in the next election and, as we saw above, this candidate tends to be the winner herself. Parties that 
lost the previous election to a woman are significantly less likely to nominate a woman (Table 3, 
columns 1 and 2). The losing party typically fielded a man so this result simply means that in the 
next election, despite the man losing to a woman, they continued to field a man.  
While the presence of an incumbent woman politician might discourage new female 
candidates in her constituency (as it would split the gendered votes), it might nevertheless encourage 
greater participation in nearby areas. However, we find no evidence of increased female candidacy, 
whether from the incumbent party or other parties, in constituencies within the same district (Table 
3, columns 3 and 4) or within the same national parliamentary constituencies (columns 5 and 6). In 
separate regressions (not shown), we replaced the female share of candidates with the new female 
share and found similar results, i.e., that there is no tendency towards increased entry of new women 
in nearby constituencies. Using data from the U.S., Broockman (2013) similarly finds no impact of a 
woman being elected on the participation of women in nearby areas.  
In the next section, we push the analysis further by investigating voter, party and candidate 
responses to women winning with a view to understanding better the mechanisms behind our 
findings.  
5. Mechanisms and Further Analysis 
In this section we investigate whether the weak demonstration effects we find are driven 
primarily by ‘demand-side’ factors, such as voter and party attitudes towards women candidates, or 
by limitations on the supply of potential candidates, such as a shortage of suitable female candidates, 
or the existence of gender-specific constraints that make women less likely than men to contest as 
candidates. We use male and female electoral turnout, votes cast for women vs men, and women’s 
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winning chances as indicators of voter preferences,19 and the gender of the party leader as an 
indicator of party preferences over women.  
 
5.1. Heterogeneity by Indicators of Gender Prejudice  
Since the views of voters and parties are likely to be shaped by prevailing social norms 
regarding the role of women, we investigate whether the candidacy response to electoral victory 
varies by indicators of societal gender bias. India has a long history of gender prejudice that has 
resulted in millions of women ‘missing’ on account of sex-selective abortion, female infanticide and 
discrimination against girls and women in terms of nutrition and health care. There were 940 women 
per 1000 men in India in the 2011 census which translates to about 0.86 million ‘missing women.’ 
The population sex ratio is now widely used to proxy for women’s social disadvantage (Sen, 2003; 
Bhalotra and Cochrane, 2010; Jayachandran and Kuzeimko, 2011).  
The population gender ratio varies widely across states, from 861 women per 1000 men in 
the northern state of Haryana to 1058 in the southern state of Kerala. A remarkable division seems 
to run right across India, splitting the country into two nearly contiguous halves, with missing 
women in the north and west but not in the south and east of the country (Dyson and Moore, 1983; 
Sen, 2003), and some studies have attributed this to time-invariant factors such as soil quality 
(Carranza, 2014). In view of this marked heterogeneity across states, we re-estimate the response of 
women’s candidacy to women winning for the groups of states with sex ratios above and below the 
median.20  
We find a much bigger response of women’s candidacy to women’s electoral victory in states 
in which the population sex ratio is less skewed or more favorable to women (Table 4, columns 1 
                                                 
19 Voter turnout is often used as an indicator of political participation and interest in politics. For instance, Washington 
(2006) shows that black and white turnout rates increase in response to black men on the ballot in U.S. elections. 
20
 Fisman et al (2014) similarly divide India into two halves marked by long-standing differences in corruption for the 
purpose of testing a mechanism (rent-seeking behaviour). 
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and 2). In particular, the female share of major party candidates increases by 5.2 percentage points in 
states where the gender ratio is skewed against women, while the corresponding effect is 13.9 
percentage points in states where the gender ratio is less biased, and this difference in the RD 
coefficients is statistically significant.21 This remarkable difference is driven both by a difference in 
the share of new women candidates, where a negative effect is observed only in the more gender-
biased states (columns 3 and 4 and Appendix Figure A3), and in the share of non-new female 
candidates (columns 5 and 6). This suggests that a social context that disadvantages women leads to 
a weaker candidacy response by both new and non-new candidates after a woman demonstrates the 
ability to win an election.  
While the results in Table 4 are estimated using state-level gender ratios from the 2001 
census as a proxy for gender bias, the results are robust to using other measures. We first show that 
these patterns hold up to using a different proxy for women’s status, namely the male-female literacy 
differential. Women’s educational outcomes are much poorer than those of men: only 65% of 
women in India were recorded as literate in the census of 2011, compared to 82% of men. We find 
that the female candidacy response to women winning is weaker in states where the male-female 
literacy differential is below the median, and that a significant ‘discouragement’ effect on new 
women candidates is present only for these states (Appendix Table A4, columns 1 and 2). Both of 
these pattern, namely, a lower overall candidacy response and a significant negative effect on the 
entry of new women candidates, are present when we use either the gender ratios from the 1981 
census (columns 3 and 4) or gender ratios at the constituency rather than the state level (columns 5 
                                                 
21 The difference in the coefficients was tested using a difference-in-discontinuities specification following Grembi, 
Nannicini and Troiano (2016). The assumptions of this model are milder than those required for a cross-sectional RD 
design or for a difference-in-differences strategy. 
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and 6). Note that the constituency-level gender ratios are subject to the influence of migration across 
constituency boundaries, while cross-state migration in India is extremely low (Mistri, 2015).22  
A potential explanation of the results is backlash, namely that seeing women in leadership 
positions intensifies societal bias against women and that this is exhibited in voter and party leader 
behaviour. We investigate this in the next section.  
 
5.2.  Voter and Party Behaviour 
Since candidates are chosen by political parties with a view to winning elections, party 
choices will reflect any gender bias among voters, as well as any bias among party leaders over and 
above voter bias. We examine whether voters and parties behave differently after observing a 
woman winning, distinguishing the behaviour of male and female voters and male and female party 
leaders.  
Voter behaviour is indicated by electoral turnout and by votes cast for female as opposed to 
male candidates. We find that both female and male voter turnout are significantly greater in 
constituencies that were won by women in the preceding election but only in states with more equal 
gender ratios, there being no significant response in the more gender-prejudiced states (Table 5, 
Panel A, columns 1-4). A woman’s electoral victory increases the vote share of all women candidates 
and the chances of a woman winning the next election, more in states with better gender ratios 
compared to states with worse gender ratios, indicating a preference for women leaders in the better 
states. However, these differences in the coefficients are not statistically significant (Table 5, Panel 
B, columns 1-4).  
                                                 
22 Recent work has documented that the fraction of female candidates is higher in constituencies reserved for the 
Scheduled Castes (SC) in India (Jensenius, 2016). Since the caste composition does not vary discontinuously at our 
threshold, this does not constitute a threat to our identification strategy. However, we do find that the discouragement 
effect for new female candidates is larger for SC-reserved constituencies, consistent with our findings since these 
constituencies have worse gender ratios and higher literacy differentials compared to unreserved constituencies. 
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 If voters or party-leaders are more likely to update their views after repeated exposure to 
women leaders, we might observe larger effects on political candidacy over time. However, there are 
very few constituencies in India in which women win a state assembly seat in a competitive election 
for two consecutive terms (less than 5% of our RD sample), making it hard to test for this repeated 
exposure effect in our data. Moreover, winning the second time is endogenous in the competitive 
setting, so we investigate the reduced form i.e. the response of candidacy in election t to a woman 
having won two elections ago (t-2) and three elections ago (t-3). At the ten-year mark (two elections 
later), we see a marginally significant increase in the share of women candidates from major parties 
in the states with better gender ratios and no effect at all on overall female candidacy in states with 
worse gender ratios (Table 5, Panel C, columns 1 and 2). At the fifteen-year mark, the candidacy 
response drops to effectively zero in all states (Table 5, Panel C, columns 3 and 4). 
We now examine the role of parties. If the different results we noted in more and less 
prejudiced contexts are attributable to intensification of gender bias within parties, and if male-
headed parties are more likely to show such intensification, then we expect a lower candidacy 
response in male-headed parties in gender-biased areas. This is indeed what we find: candidacy 
responses to women’s electoral victory are similar across all states among parties headed by women 
(Table 6, Panel A, columns 1 and 2).  Among parties headed by men, however, we see a significantly 
higher candidacy response in states with better gender ratios (Table 6, Panel A, columns 3 and 4). 
The patterns for new female candidates are similar across male and female headed parties (Table 6, 
Panel B), suggesting that gender bias persistence within parties tends to make the path to candidacy 
more difficult for women who participated in the previous election.  
Overall, the results are consistent with women’s electoral victory leading to a persistence and 
possible intensification of gender bias in more gender-prejudiced states, particularly within male-
headed parties. This is of course the opposite of the prediction of a model of statistical 
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discrimination.23 Our finding that, in less prejudiced states, incumbent women are more likely than 
incumbent men to re-contest is consistent with statistical discrimination being lowered for women 
who have been selected in (as in Fryer, 2007). However, in more prejudiced states, we see what 
would appear to be a rise in taste-based discrimination.  
In the next section, we examine two alternative explanations related to potential constraints 
on the supply of new candidates. First, we examine the extent to which a shortage of suitably 
experienced potential women candidates is a binding constraint. Second, to investigate the extent to 
which barriers to the entry of new women are gender-specific, we perform a parallel analysis of 
candidates belonging to a religious minority group (Muslims), who are also under-represented in 
political office. 
 
5.3. Supply of Experienced Candidates 
The failure of new women candidates to contest in women-led constituencies may reflect a 
shortage of suitably qualified women candidates.  In general, it is difficult to find experimental or 
exogenous variation, but we are able to exploit a massive shock to the availability of women with 
political experience created by the institution of quotas for women in local government. A 
constitutional amendment of 1993 set aside one-third of all seats in village, municipality and district 
councils for women, a large increase from the pre-reform share of approximately 5%. This created a 
cadre of women with the experience, networks and potentially, the motivation to remain in the 
political sphere and contest for legislative assembly seats. As in Iyer et al (2012), we use plausibly 
exogenous state-specific variation in the implementation of the mandate and obtain separate RD 
                                                 
23 Statistical discrimination involves stereotypes generated by the average performance of a group being applied to 
individual members of the group, and the reason that groups who are in an effective minority are often discriminated 
against is that the signal they emit is noisier (Phelps, 1972). 
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estimates for women’s candidacy response to women winning for periods before and after the 
implementation of the local government quota.  
We find a significantly higher candidacy response after quotas are implemented, but only in 
states with more biased gender ratios (Table 7, Panel A, columns 1-4). However, in neither group of 
states is the share of new candidates significantly different after the introduction of quotas (Table 7, 
Panel B). Overall, there is no evidence that shortages of suitably experienced women candidates 
drive our result of no new entry after a woman wins.  
 
5.4. Gender-Specific Constraints 
Even if there is a cadre of women politicians in local government councils, they may be 
reluctant to compete for the post of state legislator, a post that is far more demanding. Recent work 
has highlighted gender-specific barriers to women’s participation in executive positions, which are 
competitive and typically involve intensive and inflexible work schedules (Bertrand, Goldin and 
Katz, 2010). Laboratory evidence suggests that women tend to be less over-confident and more 
averse to competition than men (Petrie and Segal, 2014; Niederle, 2016), and a number of studies 
underline the role of fertility and family commitments in limiting women’s careers (Goldin, 2014). 
As discussed earlier, a related possibility is an increased reluctance of potential women candidates to 
enter politics due to ‘stereotype threat’.  
 We investigate this by conducting a parallel analysis for Muslims, with a view to isolating the 
role of women-specific constraints from the role of continued or intensified prejudice against a 
group with initially small representation. Muslims are the largest religious minority in India, 
constituting 14.2% of the population in 2011 (Hindus constitute the majority). We created a new 
data set containing the religious identity of all political candidates in India’s state elections, 
identifying Muslim candidates by their name. Our data show that Muslims are under-represented in 
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almost all major states: over the period 1980-2010, Muslims constituted 9.2% of all election 
candidates and 7.6% of election winners, and almost all (98%) of Muslim candidates are men. 
Similar to the literature on the impact of women representatives, there is some evidence that 
increasing the political representation of Muslims alters policy choices, leading to improved health 
and education outcomes (Bhalotra et al, 2014). Here, we estimate how the share of Muslim 
candidates in a constituency changes in response to a Muslim having won the previous election in a 
competitive race against a non-Muslim. Just as women are less educated than men in India on 
average, Muslims are less educated than non-Muslims on average. In contrast to the case for women 
vs men, there is a significant difference in the party affiliations of Muslim vs non-Muslim 
candidates,24 so we control for party identity in order to isolate the effect of the religion of the 
politician.  
The results for Muslims are very similar to the results for women. In the election after a 
Muslim wins a state seat, there is an increase in the share of candidates who are Muslim in that 
constituency, and this is statistically significant at the 10% level (Table 8, Panel A, columns 1-4). 
Importantly, there is no increase in the fraction of new Muslim candidates and the coefficient 
estimate is negative though not statistically significant (Table 8, Panel B). So, just as we found for 
women candidates, the overall effects on Muslim candidacy are driven by incumbent Muslim 
candidates being more likely to re-contest and there is no entry of new candidates.  
Also similar to our results for women, the coefficient of interest varies systematically across 
the states with indicators of Muslim disadvantage. The positive effects on candidacy are larger in 
states where Muslims constitute a higher share of the population (columns 5 and 6), and where the 
                                                 
24 Muslim candidates are significantly less likely to belong to the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which often espouses an 
explicit ideology of ‘Hindutva,’ and they are significantly more likely to belong to the Indian National Congress (INC) or 
the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP).  
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literacy differential between Hindus and Muslims is smaller (columns 7 and 8).25 While the standard 
errors are too large to conclude that these estimates are statistically different, it is clear that the 
patterns are similar to the patterns observed for women’s political candidacy. In particular, there is a 
statistically significant ‘discouragement’ of entry of new candidates in states where the population 
share of Muslims is low (Table 8, Panel B, column 5).The fact that the pattern of results for religious 
minorities is similar to the pattern we identified for women suggests that the results for women are 
unlikely to be predominantly a reflection of gender-specific factors.26   
 
6.  Conclusions 
Many reasons have been proposed for the gender gap in leadership positions. These 
include ‘supply-side’ factors such as the lower ambition of women (Lawless and Fox, 2010), the lack 
of women role models (Beaman et al, 2012), women’s  aversion to competitive environments 
(Gneezy et al, 2003; Petrie and Segal, 2014), their fertility and family commitments which conflict 
with intensive and inflexible work schedules (Bertrand, Goldin and Katz, 2010; Goldin, 2014) 
and ‘stereotype threat’. There can also be ‘demand-side’ factors such as parties or voters having 
greater preferences for male candidates.  It is often argued that the scarcity of female role models 
reinforces these preferences and prejudices, and that women winning in a competitive race against 
men can therefore encourage the political participation of other women. Also, if women legislators 
play a direct role in the selection of candidates for the next election, and are not contesting 
themselves, then they may directly encourage candidacy among other women.  
                                                 
25
 Using a new dataset we created on incidents of religious violence from newspaper reports in the Times of India (Kaysser 
et al, 2014, an updated version of Varshney and Wilkinson, 2006), we find that the candidacy response is also larger in 
states that experienced fewer incidents of religious violence over the period 1980-2010 (results available upon request). 
26 We attempted a similar analysis distinguishing high and low castes, but this was limited by sample size because we are 
only able to identify caste for individual candidates in elections after 2003. Examining close elections of SC/ST 
candidates against others in this limited sample, we find a similar absence of ‘demonstration effects’ on candidacy of 
Scheduled Castes (SC) and Scheduled Tribes (ST), who are the historically disadvantaged caste groups. Results are 
available upon request.  
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We investigated the presence of such demonstration effects using quasi-experimental 
constituency-level variation in women winning political office in India’s state elections. We identify a 
large and significant increase in the subsequent share of women candidates fielded by major parties 
in Indian state elections, driven entirely by a greater propensity for incumbent women relative to 
incumbent men to run for re-election. Given that a substantial fraction of incumbents in Indian state 
elections do not re-run and female incumbents overall are less likely to re-run than male incumbents, 
this is an important result.  
We decisively reject that new women candidate are induced to enter politics, either in their 
own constituency or in neighboring constituencies. In fact, a woman winning office appears to 
intensify barriers to the entry of new women in areas characterised by relatively high levels of gender 
prejudice. We find similar results following a Muslim winning against a non-Muslim candidate, 
which undermines the relevance of gender-specific preferences or constraints.  
Ours is the first systematic analysis of political candidacy in competitive elections in India. 
Our results suggest that further economic, institutional or policy incentives may be needed to 
stimulate the entry of new women into the political arena. Not only are demonstration effects too 
weak to generate an endogenous increase in women’s candidacy, demonstrated success results in 
persistence and possible intensification of barriers to political participation in gender-biased areas. 
Initiatives that are likely to have greater success are those targeted towards changing the attitudes of 
voters and parties in gender-biased areas, or those enabling women to overcome societal barriers to 
political participation. 
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Table 1
Women's Electoral Success and Future Political Candidacy: Regression Discontinuity Estimates
At least one 
female 
major party 
candidate
Female share 
of major 
party 
candidates
# of female 
major party 
candidates
# of major 
party 
candidates
Female 
share of 
competitive 
candidates
Female share 
of 
independent 
candidates
Woman wins 
election
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Panel A: Controlling for quadratic polynomials in the running variable
Woman won    0.185 ***      0.085 ***   0.166 *** 0.015 0.060 *** 0.013  -0.002
previous election  [0.038]      [0.019]     [0.046] [0.078] [0.017] [0.012] [0.034]
R-squared
Observations 5881 5881 5881 5881 5881 5504 5881
Panel B: Local linear regressions with Imbens-Kalyanaraman optimal bandwidth
Woman won 0.172*** 0.091 *** 0.176*** 0.033 0.052** 0.008  -0.027
previous election [0.051] [0.021] [0.061] [0.090] [0.021] [0.013] [0.038]
Optimal bw (IK) 0.1658 0.24421 0.1775 0.2092 0.1654 0.2102 0.2766
Observations 1350 1877 1423 1638 1360 1521 2128
Panel C: Local linear regressions with Calonico-Cattaneo-Titiunik optimal bandwidth
Woman won 0.174*** 0.088 *** 0.178 *** 0.025 0.055** 0.01  -0.114**
previous election [0.050] [0.024] [0.061] [0.109] [0.022] [0.016] [0.055]
Optimal bw (CCT) 0.1718 0.1774 0.1805 0.1509 0.1679 0.1757 0.1222
Observations 1388 1419 1446 1253 1348 1305 1044
Standard errors in brackets, clustered at the district level. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Sample
includes all  races with any female candidates as in Meyersson (2014). Optimal bandwidths are determined by the algorithms suggested 
in Imbens and Kalyanaraman 2012 (IK) and Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik 2014 (CCT).
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Table 2
Impact of Women's Electoral Success on New vs Incumbent Candidates
1 2 3 4 5
Panel A: Controlling for quadratic polynomials in the running variable
Woman won previous election -0.023 ** -0.025 0.065 * 0.149*** -0.084***
[0.010] [0.024] [0.038] [0.038] [0.024]
Observations 5874 5874 5881 5881 5881
Mean of dependent variable 0.04735 0.5338 0.6226 0.5092 0.1134
Panel B: Local linear regressions with Imbens-Kalyanaraman optimal bandwidth
Woman won previous election -0.024** -0.021 0.071 0.159*** -0.091 ***
[0.011] [0.025] [0.043] [0.044] [0.022]
Optimal bw (IK) 0.2731 0.2566 0.2319 0.2352 0.3489
Observations 2105 1976 1795 1818 2889
Panel C: Local linear regressions with Calonico-Cattaneo-Titiunik optimal bandwidth
Woman won previous election -0.01 -0.008 0.036 0.162*** -0.094 ***
[0.017] [0.032] [0.054] [0.053] [0.030]
Optimal bw (CCT) 0.1247 0.1647 0.1475 0.1511 0.2112
Observations 1059 1344 1229 1254 1648
Incumbent runs 
for re-election 
from a different 
Standard errors in brackets, clustered at the district level. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. New
candidates are defined as candidates who did not run in the previous election. They were identified by manual matching of
candidate names across election years. Sample includes all races with any female candidates as in Meyersson (2014). Optimal
bandwidths are determined by the algorithms suggested in Imbens and Kalyanaraman 2012 (IK) and Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik 
2014 (CCT).
New female 
share of major 
party candidates
New male share 
of major party 
candidates
Incumbent 
runs for re-
election
Incumbent runs 
for re-election 
from the same 
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Table 3
Candidacy Effects Across Parties and Across Geographies
All major Incumbent All major Incumbent 
1 2 3 4 5 6
Panel A: Controlling for quadratic polynomials in the running variable
Woman won previous elect 0.535*** -0.142***  0.001 -0.002  0.003  -0.007
[0.031] [0.043] [0.005]  [0.008] [0.005]  [0.008]
Observations 5881 5881 5867 5874 5874 5881
Mean of dependent variable
Panel B: Local linear regressions with Imbens-Kalyanaraman optimal bandwidth
Woman won previous elect 0.541 *** -0.161*** -0.006 -0.004  -0.003 -0.011
[0.031] [0.051]  [0.005] [0.008]  [0.005] [0.009]
Optimal bw (IK) 0.2725 0.2063 0.2666 0.2737 0.2807 0.229
Observations 2104 1617 2064 2113  2166 1773
Panel C: Local linear regressions with Calonico-Cattaneo-Titiunik optimal bandwidth
Woman won previous elect 0.536 *** -0.178 ***   -0.007 -0.011  -0.007  -0.020
[0.044] [0.053]  [0.007] [0.011]  [0.007]   [0.013]
Optimal bw (CCT) 0.133 0.1885 0.1195 0.1371 0.1217 0.1199
Observations 1116 1493 1018 1146 1041 1025
Female share of major party 
candidates in nearby 
constituencies (other 
constituencies in same district)
Non-incumbent 
parties have a 
female 
candidate 
(dummy)
Incumbent 
party has a 
female 
candidate 
(dummy)
Female share of major party 
candidates in nearby 
constituencies (other 
constituencies in same 
parliamentary constituency)
Standard errors in brackets, clustered at the district level. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Sample includes all  races 
with any female candidates as in Meyersson (2014). Optimal bandwidths are determined by the algorithms suggested in Imbens and Kalyanaraman 2012 
(IK) and Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik 2014 (CCT).
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Table 4
Women's Electoral Success and Political Candidacy: Heterogeneity by State Level Gender Prejudice
Low High Low High Low High
1 2 3 4 5 6
Panel A: Controlling for quadratic polynomials in the running variable
Woman won previous election        0.052**        0.139***       -0.032**       -0.002        0.085***        0.141***
     [0.023]      [0.031]      [0.012]      [0.020]      [0.020]      [0.029]
Observations         3714         2160         3714         2160         3714         2160
Panel B: Local linear regressions with Imbens-Kalyanaraman optimal bandwidth    
Woman won previous election        0.041          0.176***      -0.031**       0.005          0.069***       0.160***
     [0.028]        [0.028]        [0.014]        [0.019]        [0.025]        [0.031]   
Observations          929           1039          1195           867            887           825   
Optimal bw (IK) 0.1982 0.3643 0.254 0.3043 0.1885 0.2877
Panel C: Local linear regressions with Calonico-Cattaneo-Titiunik optimal bandwidth
Woman won previous election        0.030          0.121**      -0.035*        0.022          0.054*        0.053   
     [0.031]        [0.049]        [0.019]        [0.029]        [0.030]        [0.049]   
Observations          781            347           648           480            648           342   
Optimal bw (CCT) 0.1625 0.0992 0.129 0.141 0.1291 0.0973
Female population share Female population share
Female share of major 
party candidates
Standard errors in brackets, clustered at the district level. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Sample 
includes al l races with any female candidates as in Meyersson (2014). Optimal bandwidths are determined by the algorithms suggested in 
Imbens and Kalyanaraman 2012 (IK) and Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik 2014 (CCT). Low and high female population share refer to states 
with female population share above or below the national average. 
Non-new (incumbent + losers) 
female share of major party 
candidates
Female population share
New female share of 
major party candidates
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Table 5
Women's Electoral Success and Voter Behavior
Low High Low High
1 2 3 4
Panel A: Voter turnout in subsequent election
Woman won previous election       -0.009          0.055***        0.003          0.052***
     [0.013]        [0.019]        [0.011]        [0.014]   
Observations         3713           2158           3713           2158   
Panel B: Preferences for women candidates
Woman won previous election       -0.033         0.046         0.028          0.073** 
     [0.044]        [0.054]        [0.021]        [0.032]   
Observations         3714          2167          3714           2167   
Panel C: Female share of major party candidates in later elections
Woman won previous election        0.020         0.072*       -0.002         -0.019   
     [0.025]        [0.039]        [0.024]        [0.051]   
Observations         2939          1649          2171           1120   
Female population share Female population share
Standard errors in brackets, clustered at the district level. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 
10% level respectively. Sample includes al l races with any female candidates as in Meyersson (2014).
Regressions control for quadratic polynomials in the running variable. See Appendix Table A3 for
robustness to alternative bandwidth selection methods.
Second lag Third lag
Whether a woman wins the 
next election
Female Voter Turnout Male Voter Turnout
Vote share of all women 
candidates
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Table 6
Women's Electoral Success and Future Candidacy: Heterogeneity by Party Gender
Low High Low High
1 2 3 4
Panel A: Female share of major party candidates
Woman won previous election        0.002         0.008          0.050**       0.132***
     [0.012]        [0.023]        [0.022]        [0.028]   
Observations         3714           2160                       3714           2160   
Panel B: New female share of major party candidates
Woman won previous election       -0.015**      -0.012         -0.018*        0.010   
     [0.006]        [0.009]        [0.009]        [0.019]   
Observations         3714          2160           3714          2160   
Standard errors in brackets, clustered at the district level. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level
respectively. Sample includes all races with any female candidates as in Meyersson (2014). Regressions control for
quadratic polynomials in the running variable. 
Major parties headed by Major parties headed by men
Female population share Female population share
Major parties headed by Major parties headed by men
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Table 7
Women's Electoral Success and Political Candidacy Before and After Local Government Quotas
No Yes No Yes
1 2 3 4
Panel A: Female share of major party candidates
Woman won previous election        0.019          0.094***       0.224***        0.085** 
     [0.030]        [0.035]        [0.054]        [0.041]   
Observations         2220           1494            855           1305   
Panel B: New female share of major party candidates
Woman won previous election      -0.029**      -0.038*       -0.014         -0.001   
     [0.015]        [0.021]        [0.032]        [0.025]   
Observations        2220          1494           855           1305   
Standard errors in brackets, clustered at the district level. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level
respectively. Sample includes all races with any female candidates as in Meyersson (2014). Regressions control
for quadratic polynomials in the running variable. 
Local government quotas Local government quotas
Female population share is Female population share is 
Female population share is Female population share is 
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Table 8
Muslims' Electoral Success and Future Political Candidacy: Regression Discontinuity Estimates
Low High High Low
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0.028 0.037 * 0.094 *** 0.050 0.015 0.045 ** 0.033 0.067 *
[0.020] [0.020] [0.024] [0.031] [0.053] [0.021] [0.023] [0.037]
Observations 7636 7636 2447 1392 1787 5849 4820 2816
-0.028 -0.023 -0.009 -0.005 -0.085 ** -0.01 -0.016 -0.04
[0.019] [0.019] [0.017] [0.026] [0.041] [0.020] [0.022] [0.032]
Observations 7636 7636 3430 1444 1787 5849 4820 2816
Polynomial 2nd order 2nd order 2nd order 2nd order 2nd order 2nd order
Bandwidth
optimal 
(IK)
optimal 
(CCT)
Party controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Hindu-Muslim 
literacy differential
Muslim won 
previous election
Muslim won 
previous election
Standard errors in brackets, clustered at the district level. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level
respectively. Sample includes all races with any Muslim candidates. Optimal bandwidths are determined by the
algorithms suggested in Imbens and Kalyanaraman 2012 (IK) and Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik 2014 (CCT). In each
case, the first column in a pair indicates a stronger potential Muslim disadvantage. Muslim population share and
Hindu-Muslim literacy differential data are from 2001 state-level census for 16 major states. Classification for
population share is bottom 8 states (low population share) versus top 8. Classification for l iteracy differential is less
than 1 percentage point (low differential) versus others. 
Panel B: New Muslim candidate share in major 
Muslim population 
share
Panel A: Muslim share of major party candidates
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